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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF "CHANCE-MIEDLEY"
THE LAW OF MANSLAUGHTER

IN

It is generally agreed that the earliest situation in which an
intentional homicide might be held to be manslaughter was a killing
upon chance-medley' usually defined as a sudden affray.- It is the
purpose of this note to examine the origins of the term and of the
concept which it signified, and to trace its development m order that
today's law of voluntary manslaughter may be more clearly understood.
Etymologically, the term "medley" is derived from the ancient
French meddle or melle' or from barbarous Latin terms' signifying
an "affray" as do the French terms. The word "chance" connotes
The term has been written "chancesuddenness and casualness
medley," as already defined, or "chaud-medley" signifying "an
affray in the heat of blood."' Such fine distinctions, however, need
not here be discussed. "Chance-medley" will be used as it is generally written and understood.
What is believed to be the earliest employment of the term of
record is in the Statute of Henry VIII' wherein it was enacted that
a person killing another who was attempting to rob or murder the
killer was not subject to forfeiture of goods as was one who, "by
chance-medley should happen to kill or slay any other personin his
or their defence." Foster, in commenting upon the statute, styles
this type of homicide "self-defence upon chance-medley,"' and defines it as a killing which resulted from a situation wherein one
"engaged in a sudden affray quitted the combat before a mortal
wound given, and retreated or fled as far as he could with safety,
and then, urged by mere necessity, killed his adversary for the
preservation of his own life."' Thus it is found that the use of "selfdefence upon chance-medley" in this early statute is not intended
as a definition of a situation which would constitute the crime of
manslaughter, but is a case of homicide justifiable in self-defense.
This is, however, in no way contradictory to the subsequent use of
the term "chance-medley" by Coke and other writers.
'2 BURDICK, THE LAW Or CRIME (1946) sec. 458.
'BLACK,

LAW DICTIONARY

(3rd ed. 1933),

(2d ed. 1791) 276.
'COKE,

THIRD INST.

(6th ed. 1680) 57.

supra note 2.
'COKE, loc. cit. supra note 3.
6FosTER, loc. cit. supra note 2.
'24 HEN. VIII, c. 5 (1532).
'FOSTER, loc. cit. supra note 2.
'Ibid.
4 FOSTER, loc. czt.
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Staunford, in his Pleas of the Crown, published in 1560, makes
use of the term when he contrasts "homicide par chance medley" and
"homicide perpetre per voy de murder."'" It is in Coke's Third Institute, however, that we find the clearest and most often cited
rationalization of the concept of homicide upon chance-medley Coke
distinguishes between murder and manslaughter by citing as the
differentiating factor the presence or absence of "malice forethought"- "There is no difference between Murder and Manslaughter, but that the one is upon malice forethought, and the other upon
a sudden occasion: and therefore is called Chance-medley."" A
homicide upon chance-medley was declared to be felonious' 2 and was
defined by Coke as a killing without "malice forethought" in a
"suddent brawle, shuffling, or contention."'"
The reason for the infliction of a more lenient punishment upon
one guilty of homicide upon chance-medley than upon one guilty of
murder was apparently so well established and understood in Cokes
time as to cause him to see no need for an explanation thereof in his
work. The statutes dividing murder and manslaughter" recognized
the differing degrees of abhorrence with which the crimes are to be
viewed and established accordingly different methods of punishment. A homicide committed without "malice forethought" in a
"sudden contention" was less reprehensible than a "premeditated"
homicide;" hence the differing degrees of punishment.
It should be remembered that, at the time of Coke, "provocation" was scarcely existent in the terminology of manslaughter. The
law recognized but one situation in which there might occur the
crime of manslaughter," that is, chance-medley, the one just described. Thus not the provoking character of an act by the deceased
but the suddenness of the affray and mutuality of the conflict were
the factors to be considered in determining whether an intentional
kiler was guilty of murder or of manslaughter.
During the period following the publication of Coke's work, the
law of manslaughter underwent a change of emphasis, culminating
in 1707 with Regina v. Mawgndge," which case first presented a

satisfactory enunciation of the doctrine of provocation. This case,
citing early commentators and reviewing preceding decisions,
declared that the law recognized certain situations so provoking
"03

HOLDSwORTH, HISTORY

note 3.
"COKE,
1 Ibid.

OF ENGLISH LAW

(3rd ed. 1923) 314,

Op. cit. supra note 3, at 55.

"Id.

at 57.
VII, c. 7 (1496), 23 HEN. VIII, c. 1 (1531), 1 EDW VI,
c. 12 (1547).
" COKE, loc. cit. supra note 3.

u 12

HEN.

6

" BURDICK, loc. cit. supra note 1.

"7Kelyng 119, 84 Eng. Rep. R. 1108 (1707).
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as to "alleviate the act of killing, so as to reduce it to be but a bare
homicide."' 8 These provocations were declared to be: (1) angry
and sudden assaults upon one, (2) similar assaults upon one's
friend who is with one at the time, (3) seeing any person abused
by force and going to his rescue, (4) unlawful arrest, and (5)
seeing one's wife in an act of adultery. Obviously, this doctrine more
clearly defines specific situations in which a horrcide nght be
held to be manslaughter; yet the problem remains: Did the doctrine
of provocation enlarge the number of situations in which a killing
constituted the lesser degree of intentional homicide?
Apparently it did. Clearly, any of the enumerated provoking
situations might result in a chance-medley; yet the provocation
doctrine did not, as did the doctrine of chance-medley, require
that the killer and the deceased should have engaged in combat.
The elements to be considered, according to this case, were the
absence of "malice prepensed" and the incidence of a sufficient
provocation. Thus it may be concluded that a new doctrine entered
the law of manslaughter. Whether it completely replaced the
original doctrine or supplemented it is a question to be considered
below.
Apparently by 1707, the term "chance-medley" had, for all
practical purposes, disappeared from the terminology of the criminal
law. Regina v. Mawgridge made no mention of the term and later
writers used the term only in historical reviews of the crime of
manslaughter," and to point out the erroneous confusion of the term
with "homicide by misadventure."' From this, then, one might
conclude that the doctrine of homicide upon chance-medley was
replaced in, and excluded from, the law of manslaughter by the advent of the provocation doctrine. It appears, however, that only the
term became obsolete and that there remamed-indeed there remain
today-vestiges of the ancient doctrine. The definition of manslaughter as propounded by East a century after Regina v. Mawgrzdge is an example: "Whenever death ensues from sudden transport of passion or heat of blood, if upon reasonable provocation and
without malice, or if upon sudden combat, it will be manslaughter."2 '
It is submitted that the foregoing definition clearly indicates the
continued acceptance of the doctrine of chance-medley; for how may
or if upon sudden combat"'?
one differently interpret the words "
It appears that East has merely made a substitution of terms, but
"18Regma
v Mawgridge, Kelyng, 119, 84 Eng. Rep. R. 1108, 1114
(1707).
"'FOSTER, l0c. cit. supra note 2; 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
(1806) 232.
"14 BLACKSTONE, COMM. (11th ed. 1790) 184.
2' 1 EAST, loc. cit. supra note 19.
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that there existed in the law at that time two distinct types of situations in which a killing might be manslaughter: as a result of adequate provocation and upon a "sudden combat."
The more common definition of manslaughter today, however,
makes no such distinction. Indeed, one recognized writer says:
"
the terms chance-medley and chaude-medley became obsolete
in time, and voluntary manslaughter was defined, at common law,
as the felonious and intentional killing of another, without malice
aforethought, but in a sudden heat of passion caused by adequate
legal provocation."' A leading case defines voluntary manslaughter
as follows:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another
without malice; and may be
voluntary, as when
the act is committed with a real design and purpose to
kill, but through the violence of sudden passion, occasionea by some great provocation, which in tenderness for the frailty of human nature the law considers
sufficient to palliate the criminality of the offense.
"
Although the opinion subsequently quotes East's definition, supra,
the foregoing or similar definitions are widely quoted and accepted."
It will be noted that this definition considers only the provocation
basis.
On the other hand, at least one jurisdiction, Kentucky, has defined voluntary manslaughter as an intentional homicide in a sudden affray or in sudden heat of passion arising from adequate provocation.' Here there is to be found the same classification made by
East. It is believed, however, that the division into two categories
does not materially affect the requirement of adequate provocation
in any given case; for more than once the Kentucky Court of Appeals has quoted with approval definitions which indicate that
nothing but reasonable provocation will reduce an intentional homicide to manslaughter.
Finally, the law of homicide in mutual combat will be examined.
While it is doubted whether a satisfactory distinction can be made
between "sudden affray" as used in the Kentucky definition, supra,
and mutual combat, the difference in terminology renders a separate examination more practical. A good definition of mutual combat
is found in a Massachusetts case: "When two meet, not intending to
2

2 BURmicx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 184-185.

1 Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass. 295, 304 (1850).
'Reeves v. State, 186 Ala. 14, 65 So. 160 (1914), State v. Elliott,
40 Del. 250, 8 Atl. 2d 873 (1939), People v Oberlin, 355 1ll. 317, 189
N.E. 333 (1934), State v. White, 138 N.C. 704, 51 S.E. 44 (1905).
'Beach v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 763, 43 S.W 2d 6 (1931),
Cavanaugh v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 799, 190 S.W 123 (1916).
'Shorter v. Commonwealth, 252 Ky. 472, 67 S.W 2d 695 (1934);
McHargue v Commonwealth, 231 Ky 82, 21 S.W 2d 115 (1929).
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quarrel, and angry words suddenly arise, and a conflict springs up
in which blows are given on both sides, without much regard to who
is the assailant, it is a mutual combat."'
This situation may clearly be called chance-medley. In the time
of Coke, had a killing occurred in such a combat, and had no proof
been offered tending to show malice, the killing would have been a
homicide upon chance-medley hence manslaughter. It would appear, then, that here is a situation in which the existence of provocation is not considered. A recent Georgia case thus analyzed the
problem: "This grade [voluntary manslaughter] is of two types,
distinguished by the motivating facts which prompt the act rather
than the ends to be obtained, the one being based upon passion supposed to be irresistible and the other on the principle of mutual
combat."'
This view, however, does not appear to be widely held, and the
crime is generally defined in terms of provocation alone. = Despite
such variance of view, it is thought that the difference in the method
of approach would not materially affect the outcome in mutual combat cases. Professor Burdick has stated the rule in mutual combat
cases as it would apply to those jurisdictions which require provocation as an element of voluntary manslaughter: "If two persons
quarrel and forthwith engage in a fight, whether with deadly
weapons or not, the blows of each are a sufficient provocation to
the other, regardless of which person is in the right, or which person struck the first blow. '
It is believed, therefore, that despite the fact that several jurisdictions have, by definition, distinguished between homicides m sudden affray or mutual combat and those arising from adequate provocation, such a distinction is today largely theoretical and that the
law of voluntary manslaughter might be simplified were the rule
stated in all jurisdictions wholly in terms of provocation.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the first voluntary manslaughter cases were those homicides which occurred upon chancemedley* that the concept of "provocation" entered the law at a later
date, largely supplanting the chance-medley doctrine; but that the
latter remains today in the law of several jurisdictions which distinguish between situations affording provocation and situations of
sudden affray or mutual combat. It is further submitted that since
such a distinction rests upon historical theory and terminology and
is of no practical value today the law of voluntary manslaughter
Might be simplified and confusion avoided by a statement of the law
JoHN R. GILLESPIE
in terms of "provocation" alone.
' Op. cit. supra note 23 at 308.
'Watson v. State, 66 Ga. App. 242, 17 S.E. 2d 559 (1941).
'People v Ortiz, 320 Ill. 205, 150 N.E. 708 (1926), Braumer v.
State, 105 Neb. 355, 180 N.W 567 (1920).
' 2 BURDICK, Op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 262e.
2

